17) Kornilov’s Insurrection

" 'Isn’t it time to arrest the government?’ asked the visitors. ‘No, not yet,’ was the answer. ‘Use Kerensky as a gun-rest to shoot Kornilov. Afterward we will settle with Kerensky’ "

Kerensky’s Plot 

The news of the fall of Riga on August 21st coincided with the rising tide of opposition. This defeat was, as stated above, a key part of Kornilov’s planned calendar for insurrection. That's the only explanation for why army headquarters had completely failed to supply sufficient men, arms or supplies to the defenders of the city. The rank-and-file soldiers and sailors had made a brave stand to defend this revolutionary centre, well aware that the route to Petrograd also lay open behind it. But the generals had made no attempt to organise any meaningful defence at all.

Of course, this didn’t stop headquarters filling the press in the days after the defeat with slanderous attacks on the army for its supposed ‘refusal to fight’. “The soldiers’ front quivered with resentment, indignation and disgust. Protests poured in from all sides. But nothing had any effect. This slandering of the army was a necessary part of the conspiracy which had its centre in headquarters” (105).

Yet, while even Izvestia and the Compromisist leaders were driven to protest against the provocative insults from headquarters, Kerensky issued an order praising the officers and backing up the attacks on the soldier masses. Why? Because Kerensky, who had been in contact with the generals since early June, was also now part of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy. He assumed that a successful counter-revolution would leave him in control. As Sukhanov rightly said of Kerensky: “He was a Kornilovist – only on the condition that he himself should stand at the head of the Kornilovists” (106).

Kerensky decided he could best cut the ground from under the feet of his rival for dictator, Kornilov, by carrying out the General's programme for himself. He attempted to shield his real intentions by ordering the arrest of two of the Grand Dukes on August 21st but, as the Moscow Bolshevik paper said at the time: “To arrest a pair of brainless puppets from the Romanov family and leave at liberty … the military clique of the army commanders with Kornilov at the head – that is to deceive the people”. Trotsky adds: “The Bolsheviks were hated for this, too, that they saw everything, and talked out loud about it” (107).

On August 22nd Kerensky made a request to General Kornilov for a cavalry corps to be put under his disposal. The plan was to “first concentrate a cavalry corps in Petrograd, then declare the capital under martial law, and only after that publish the new laws [to establish the death penalty at the rear as well as at the front] which were to provoke a Bolshevik insurrection” (108).

On August 25th, the Bolshevik paper ‘the Proletarian’ was suppressed even while it was urging restraint in the face of growing rumours of an impending insurrection. As “The Worker”, coming out in its place asked: “Whose hand is taking such care that the workers shall not know that the party is warning them against provocation?” (109).

On August 26th, the Bolshevik C.C. again repeated its warning against unknown provocateurs calling people onto the streets. The Petrograd Soviet, trade unions and factory committees all made announcements making clear that none of them were organising any demonstrations either. Meanwhile, Kerensky tried one final manoeuvre to win over the Right to him, issuing a provocative decree doubling the price of grain.

Kornilov puts his plans into action

Kornilov had, meanwhile, been continuing with his own plans. In early August, under the cover of manoeuvring troops for the defence of Riga, he had already moved four cavalry divisions into place for his attack on Petrograd. From August 20th, final preparations were being put in place.

Orders were given to supply the cavalry with hand grenades to help them in street battles. Then, as the Bolsheviks were refusing to be provoked into an uprising, the Cossack colonel Dutov was given the job of artificially instigating one as an excuse to initiate the coup.

Kornilov was happy to let Kerensky think that he was working to the Minister-President’s plan. However, he had absolutely no intention of letting Kerensky take the power intended for himself. On August 26th, Kornilov finally revealed his true intentions, sending a telegram to Kerensky demanding that the government transfer power to him as commander-in-chief.

That evening, the government ministers resigned so that they could withdraw to the sidelines and await the outcome of the struggle.

“With one conspiracy – the common one – Kornilov was covering up another – his own private one. At the same time that Kerensky … was intending to clean up the Bolsheviks, and in part the soviets, Kornilov was intending also to clean up the Provisional Government. It was just this that Kerensky did not want” (110).

Kerensky, in turn, was not going to give way. He replied to Kornilov ordering him to resign from his post. The general of course refused, and, declaring the Provisional Government to be in league with the German general staff, ordered his troops to move on Petrograd. So by August 27th, just as he had planned, Kornilov’s insurrection had begun.

By August 28th, all but one of the army commanders had declared support for Kornilov and his troops were fast approaching the capital. Trotsky suggests these included armoured cars driven by British operators. By the 29th, reports told of fighting taking place at a train station a mere 33 km from Petrograd.

The plot leaders, together with their backers in the Allied embassies, had every belief that they would succeed. They weren’t alone - several of the Soviet leaders quickly supplied themselves with foreign passports to get ready to flee the country. The stock exchange responded to the insurrection with an immediate rise in values.

Kerensky was left to decide whether to throw himself into the camp of Left or Right – perhaps now recognising he was no longer wanted by any side. Miliukov and British Ambassador Buchanan stepped in to see if they could persuade Kerensky to accept a way out – and provide an easy victory for the counter-revolution without them having to fight.

A plan was hatched where Kerensky would agree to give up power to General Alexeiev. But, just as a deal seemed close, Kerensky’s imminent capitulation was scuppered by the intervention of a deputation from the ‘Committee of Struggle against Counter-Revolution’.

This ad hoc Soviet body had been created on the evening of the 27th at a joint session of the worker-soldiers’ and peasants’ ECs. It comprised delegates from the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and SRs, along with representation from the unions and the Petrograd Soviet. While still not challenging Kerensky’s leadership, despite his obvious treachery, the Committee of Defence’s intervention at least ensured Miliukov’s negotiations were abandoned.

The Bolsheviks organise defence

Kerensky and the EC may by now have agreed to combat Kornilov’s conspiracy, but the real action was already being directed under a very different leadership. The Bolshevik Party had, of course, not been taken by surprise by an uprising that they had been expecting. Now, forewarned and forearmed, they were the first to organise the defence of the revolution.

“At the joint session of the Executive Committees, on August 27th, Sokolnikov announced that the Bolshevik Party had taken all measures available to it in order to inform the people of the danger and prepare for defence” (111).

The district soviets, largely under Bolshevik leadership, had taken the initiative to form workers’ militia, to organise flying brigades to arrest counter-revolutionaries and to take control of local administration from the government commissars. “The entrance of the Petrograd districts into the arena of struggle instantly changed both its scope and its direction. Again the inexhaustible vitality of the soviet form of organisation was revealed. Although paralysed from above by the leadership of the Compromisers, the soviets were reborn again from below at the critical moment under pressure from the masses” (112).

Powers to deploy troops in the name of the Provisional government had been given to the Committee of Defence set up by the ECs, also becoming known as the Military Revolutionary Committee. Although officially in a minority on the MRC, it was the Bolsheviks, with their bold approach and firm links with the masses, who effectively took command.

“Intensity in the struggle was everywhere and always brought forth the more active and bolder elements. This automatic selection inevitably elevated the Bolsheviks … giving them de facto leadership even where they were in a minority. The nearer you came to the district, to the factory, to the barrack, the more complete … was the leadership of the Bolsheviks. A tie was formed from below, from the shop, leading through the districts, to the Central Committee of the party” (113).

At the same time, Lenin, even from hiding, was firmly warning against any ‘compromisism’ with Kerensky’s camp. “ ‘We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov,’ wrote Lenin, ‘but we are not supporting Kerensky, but exposing his weakness. This is a different thing. We must struggle ruthlessly against phrases … about supporting the Provisional Government’ ” (114).

At the Bolsheviks’ initiative, instructions were issued by the Committee of Defence to railworkers, soldiers and telegraph clerks to accept orders about troop movements only from them. Searches and arrests were made in the military schools and officers’ quarters.

The Committee also agreed to the arming of workers to defend the districts and factories. This gave the green light to thousands of workers to join the ranks of the Red Guard. “Drilling began in marksmanship and the handling of weapons. Experienced soldiers were brought in as teachers. By the 29th … the Red Guard announced its readiness to put in the field a force of 40,000 rifles. The unarmed workers formed companies for trench-digging … fortification, barbed wire fencing” (115).

The newly formed railworkers union, Vikzhel, had good reason to organise against Kornilov. The General had made clear that he intended to impose martial law on the railways. The rank-and-file railworkers got to work tearing up and barricading tracks to hold up his army.

The generals were soon taught a lesson that transport and communications were as much political as technical questions. A stop was put on rail traffic in and out of Moghiliev, where army headquarters was situated. The postal and telegraph clerks forwarded copies of the generals’ orders to the Committee of Defence.

In Petrograd, the unions ensured the Committee had the office staff, funds, transport and printing facilities it required. “The rebel general had stamped his foot, and legions rose up from the ground – but they were the legions of the enemy” (116).

The sailors and the Cossacks

In the naval base at Helsingfors, a revolutionary committee took charge. One ship’s officers, who openly declared themselves Kornilovists, were shot dead by their crew. Cheidze sent a telegram condemning ‘lynch law’ but, as Trotsky points out: “The responsibility rests wholly on the government … who at a moment of danger would run for help to the revolutionary masses, in order afterward to turn them over again to the counter-revolutionary officers” (117).

For the first time Cossack delegates were introduced into the Helsingfors Soviet as events pushed their ranks to the left.

The Cossacks had long been a key weapon for the bourgeoisie. Their outlook sprang from their peculiar position as a privileged caste based in southern Russia. From February onwards, they had refused to send deputies to the Petrograd Soviet so as not to associate themselves with the workers and peasants. But the war had nevertheless opened up divisions within the Cossacks and the ranks started to discuss with the soldiers and sailors. Kornilov, as a Cossack, was relying on their military support but found to his consternation that “the villagers were ready to defend land in their own territory ferociously enough, but they had no desire to get mixed up in somebody else’s quarrel” (118).

Kronstadt had always been a thorn in the side of the reaction. Now fully recovered from July, the Kronstadt Soviet declared its readiness to fight to the last man to defeat Kornilov. They also took the opportunity to remove the commanding staff imposed on them after July and install their own.

Although they didn’t know it, in fighting Kornilov they were also fighting against their own annihilation. Part of Kornilov and Kerensky’s previous ‘joint’ plan had included mass executions of the sailors. Now Kerensky was having to call on the Kronstadters to save his own skin!

The E.C. sent messages to Kronstadt and other garrisons appealing for troops to defend Petrograd. They began to arrive on the morning of the 29th, made up largely of Bolshevik units. The troops had only been prepared to move once they had also received the instruction from the Bolshevik C.C.

Sailors from the cruiser Aurora agreed to defend the government in the Winter Palace against the Kornilovists. Yet some of the crew were still imprisoned by the same government in Kresty prison for their involvement in the July Days! Despite concerted demands, Kerensky stubbornly continued to refuse to release any of the July prisoners.

A delegation from the Aurora came to meet Trotsky, Raskolnikov and others in Kresty. “ ‘Isn’t it time to arrest the government?’ asked the visitors. ‘No, not yet,’ was the answer. ‘Use Kerensky as a gun-rest to shoot Kornilov. Afterward we will settle with Kerensky’ ” (119).

Kornilov’s plans are shattered

“On the 28th of August, the commander of the Savage Division ... informed Kornilov that ‘the natives would fulfil their duty to the fatherland’. Only a few hours later the division came to a halt; and on the 31st of August ... the division would submit absolutely to the Provisional Government. All this happened … without the firing of a single shot. The conspiracy disintegrated, crumbled, evaporated in the air” (120).

The leaders of the insurrection had badly misjudged the deep roots that had been sunk by the revolution. This mistake turned all their other plans into dust. “The conspiracy was conducted by those circles who were not accustomed to know how to do anything without the lower ranks, without labour forces, without cannon-fodder, without orderlies, servants, clerks, chauffeurs, messengers, cooks, laundresses, switchmen, telegraphers, stablemen, cab drivers. But all these little human bolts and links … were for the Soviet and against Kornilov. The revolution … penetrated everywhere, coiling itself around the conspiracy” (121).

For example, when the Cossack troops under General Krymov arrived on the 28th at Luga, to the south of Petrograd, the local railworkers refused to move the troop trains, giving a shortage of locomotives as an excuse. Once his threats had produced the engines, Krymov found they still couldn’t move because of sabotage to the tracks.

Meanwhile, 20,000 soldiers from the Luga garrison had surrounded Krymov’s troops. “There was no military encounter, but there was something far more dangerous: contact, social exchange” (122). To try and protect his men from the corrosive agitation, Krymov withdrew to villages outside Luga but the agitators - soldiers, workmen, railworkers - simply followed.

The railworkers made sure that artillery and troops would mysteriously end up on the wrong tracks so that different parts of Krymov’s army were eventually scattered across eight different railways. Telegraph clerks added to the sabotage by holding up Kornilov’s orders and passing them on to the local soviets instead. After one final token foray, Krymov gave up - only to be later arrested and brought to the Winter Palace. Shamed and humiliated, Krymov then took his own life.

The ‘Savage Division’ of fierce troops from the Caucasian mountains was due to meet up with Krymov’s men but also found their way barred by railworkers. A Muslim delegation was organised to negotiate with the men from the Caucasus. By the end of the discussion, the soldiers had been disabused of the lies spread by their commanders about a supposed rebellion being led by German agents in Petrograd. What’s more, they had even raised a red flag on their staff car inscribed with ‘Land and Freedom’ before arresting the officer who had tried to order them to take it down!

Even from a technical point of view the preparations for the insurrection had been completely inept. The 1,350 men of the Savage Division were short of 600 rifles. Officers that had been recruited with offers of extra pay and private cars had taken the bribes then disappeared.

In the capital itself, around 2,000 of Kornilov’s supporters were meant to have organised the capture of key buildings and the arrest of members of the Government and Soviet. As it turned out, the leading conspirators ran off with the funds allocated to them. Others simply got themselves drunk.

As for Colonel Dutov, who was supposed to provoke an uprising, he “subsequently complained: ‘ I ran … and called people to come into the streets, but nobody followed me.’ ” (123) !

As Trotsky points out: “Why was a patriotic enterprise entered into ... for the most part, by drunkards, spendthrifts and traitors? Is it not because every historic task mobilises the cadres that are adequate to it? “(124).

Kornilov himself may have been a popular figure with the reaction but could only provoke angry opposition from the masses That was particularly true of the peasant infantry who rightly saw him as an agent of the landlords. It seems that Kornilov wasn’t so sure of his own success himself - he kept himself out of harm’s way in Moghiliev throughout, later blaming it on an attack of malaria.

Kerensky, true to form, made one last attempt to patch up a deal and dispatched Alexeiev to meet with Kornilov. But facing a barrage of angry protests demanding Kornilov’s execution, Kerensky at least had to concede to his arrest. An Inquiry Commission into the events slowly dragged on until Kornilov was able to flee during the October revolution. He, along with other conspirators, went on to help start the civil war, in another effort to crush the Russian Revolution.