28) Arming the Revolution

"The first task of every insurrection is to bring the troops over to its side. The chief means of accomplishing this are the general strike, mass processions, street encounters, battles at the barricades. The unique thing about the October revolution … was that, thanks to a happy combination of circumstances, the proletarian vanguard had won over the garrison of the capital before the moment of open insurrection"

 

'Red Guards'

A unique situation

“The first task of every insurrection is to bring the troops over to its side. The chief means of accomplishing this are the general strike, mass processions, street encounters, battles at the barricades. The unique thing about the October revolution … was that, thanks to a happy combination of circumstances, the proletarian vanguard had won over the garrison of the capital before the moment of open insurrection [and] fortified this conquest through the organisation of the Garrison Conference. It is impossible to understand the mechanics of the October revolution without fully realising that the … task … was fully accomplished in Petrograd before the beginning of the armed struggle” (122).

But even with the support of the overwhelming majority of the garrison, an insurrection was still required. The minority that was opposed to the revolution could not be won over politically, they had to be defeated militarily. And those enemies were the best trained elements of the army – the officers, junkers (the students of the officer schools), shock battalions and, although their allegiance was still to be tested, perhaps the Cossacks too. Forces could also be brought from the front.

Zinoviev and Kamenev were quick to point to the strength of this military opposition. “But … if an army as a whole is a copy of society, then when society openly splits, both armies are copies of the two warring camps. The army of the possessors contained the wormholes of isolation and decay” (123).

The reactionary monarchist officers bitterly hated the Bolsheviks but, as the Kornilov events had already proved, were too demoralised to provide a serious fighting force. The junkers were also divided between hereditary fighters, sons of officers, and those that had signed up to the schools from a less privileged background.

The few socialist junkers in the schools kept Smolny informed of developments. They reported that, as the critical moments arrived, even the junkers began to debate whether it was worthwhile risking their lives to come to this Government’s aid.

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks needed to be sure of a reliable fighting force. But, on the whole, this was not going to be found within the garrison. Even though sympathetic to Bolshevism, the rupture between the soldier ranks and their hostile officers had created a breakdown of military organisation that left many units incapable of organising a serious struggle – on anybody’s side!

Nevertheless, scattered amongst the garrison were strong revolutionary nuclei that were able to draw the more passive mass after them. A few individual units had still preserved their discipline and fighting capacity. This proved sufficient to put on a show of force in October, before the army completely fell apart.

The Red Guard

A workers’ militia offered a more reliable force than the demoralised garrison, as long as they had arms with which to fight. Revolvers and rifles had found their way into the workers’ hands when military stores had been raided during the February revolution and through the support of friendly regiments since then.

In Petrograd, the workers’ militias were, for much of 1917, of little consequence compared to the strength of the Government state apparatus. However, in some of the industrial provinces, the Workers’ Guard had succeeded in arresting managers, preventing sabotage and defending machinery and raw materials.

The threat of armed workers frightened both the property owners and the Compromisers who strived hard to control the distribution of arms within the capital. After the July Days, the disarming of workers’ districts was carried out by force. “However, what the workers gave up as weapons was mostly old rubbish. All the very valuable guns were carefully concealed. Rifles were distributed among the most reliable members of the party. Machine-guns smeared with tallow were buried in the ground. Detachments of the Guard closed up shop and went underground, closely adhering to the Bolsheviks” (124).

Before July, the arming of the workers had been the responsibility of factory and district party committees. Once the prospect of armed insurrection emerged, the Military Organisation of the Bolsheviks took up the organisation of the Red Guard. It was the Kornilov insurrection that allowed the Guard to operate openly and legally, with about 25,000 workers enrolled in companies.

“Drill in the art of handling a rifle … formerly carried on in flats and tenements, was now brought out into the … parks, the boulevards. While the old czarist army was disintegrating, the foundation of a future Red Army was being laid in the factories” (125).

Of course, once the Kornilov threat was over, the Compromisers tried to clamp down again on the supply of arms. For example, the 30,000 men of the Putilov factory were only issued 500 rifles. The organisation of the Red Guard then ebbed somewhat, although its cadres were still firmly in place in every factory.

Once the Bolsheviks won a majority in the Soviet, the Red Guard became its official instrument and quickly flowered again. Intense rifle practice took place in factories and workplaces across Petrograd. By mid-October, when the Bolsheviks were firmly set on a course for insurrection, some factories had almost every worker enrolled in the Guard. Formally, it remained a non-party organisation. In practice, with its command elected by each company, the Bolsheviks provided its leadership.

Even as the insurrection drew near, the Red Guard still remained relatively small, with around 20,000 fighters represented at its Petrograd Conference on October 22nd. The supply of weapons was even more limited, to the annoyance of the volunteers. But it was impossible to directly seize weapons from the arsenals without openly starting the insurrection.

As well as the riflemen, specialised units of machine-gunners, telegraphers, sappers and so on were recruited. The working women created Red Cross divisions. Sentries were on duty in the factories night and day. Patrols kept guard on key posts with the particularly keenly organised Vyborg district even stealing the keys of the drawbridges over the river in preparation for battle.

“The organisation of the Red Guard remained, of course, extremely far from complete. But the Red Guard, recruited from the most self-sacrificing workers, was burning to carry the job through this time to the end. And that was the decisive thing. Whereas the garrison represented a compulsory assemblage of old soldiers defending themselves against war, the divisions of the Red Guard were newly constructed by individual selection on a new basis and with new aims” (126).

The balance of forces

As well as the garrison and the Red Guard, the MRC also had the sailors of the Baltic Fleet at its disposal. Unlike the peasant soldiers, the sailors were often from a working-class background, possessed a much higher political level and were still in active military service.

“For active operations it was possible to count firmly upon the armed Bolsheviks, upon the divisions of the Red Guard, upon the advanced group of the sailors, and upon the better preserved regiments. The different elements of this collective army supplemented each other. The numerous garrisons lacked the will to fight. The sailor detachments lacked numbers. The Red Guard lacked skill. The workers together with the sailors contributed energy, daring and enthusiasm. The regiments of the garrison constituted a rather inert reserve, imposing in its numbers and overwhelming in its mass. The very plan of the insurrection was based to a considerable degree upon a calculation of these differences” (127).

Against these forces stood the forces of the possessing classes. But the property holders themselves, even their sons and students, however deep their hostility to the Bolsheviks, weren’t used to actually fighting for themselves. But now that the Compromisers had lost control of the garrison and the soviets, the ruling-class was left with no army to defend itself.

The Compromisers still had some base within the higher ranks of the railway clerks and railworkers and even the Kadets had some support in the post and telegraph service. However, in both sectors, the lower ranks bore some class hostility to their managers. The MRC estimated that if the rail and post clerks saw the Bolsheviks taking decisive action, then they would follow their lead.

The only other hope for the bourgeoisie was to rely on troops from outside the capital to put down an insurrection in Petrograd. The Bolsheviks knew this threat could not be entirely discounted but, again, their calculations suggested that Petrograd would be able to take, and hold, the power.

A conference of soviets of the Petrograd province held early in October and attended by delegates from the surrounding garrisons had indicated that, through the bridge of the Left SRs, these troops were swiftly moving towards the Bolsheviks. Although indicating some weak points, the report given to the Bolshevik C.C. on October 16th also gave a generally encouraging picture of the political allegiance of nearby garrisons.

Things were even better on the Northern front and in Finland where, thanks to the work of Smilga, Antonov and Dybenko, the soviets had already won total control of the Helsingfors garrison and the Baltic fleet. Through them, the sailors in the naval base at Reval were also being brought on side.

After discussions at the Northern Regional Congress about how to take advantage of this position of strength, Smilga had returned to Helsingfors to organise a detachment of sailors, infantry and artillery ready to move on Petrograd when summoned.

Elsewhere on the front, the troops were also swinging sharply towards Bolshevism. Throughout October, elections to the army committees had been held and were everywhere removing the old Compromisist leaders and replacing them with Bolsheviks. Even on the remote south-western front the handful of Bolshevik sympathisers were able to convince thousands to come out in support of insurrection. Even the rank-and-file Cossacks, the last hope of the government for salvation, were turning against their Kornilovist officers.

“Of that front which in the early days of March had kissed the hands and feet of liberal priests, had carried Kadet ministers on its shoulders, got drunk on the speeches of Kerensky, and believed that the Bolsheviks were German agents – of that there was nothing left. Those rosy illusions had been drowned in the mud of the trenches, which the soldiers refused to go on kneading with their leaky boots” (128).