"A revolutionary party can turn its back to a parliament only if it has
set itself the immediate task of overthrowing the existing regime"
 |
| Kerensky |
The Provisional Government had gone to pieces on the night of August 26th. After Kornilov’s defeat, it needed to be put back together again. The Compromisers decided that, despite his treachery, they still needed Kerensky to lead it. After a few days of wrangling, it was agreed to settle on a ‘directory’ of five, largely insignificant, others to rule with him.
Kerensky, of course, hoped that he could now simply return to his plan to carry out Kornilov’s programme for himself. “There was only one drawback: the victory over the counter-revolution had been far more sweeping than was demanded by the personal plans of Kerensky” (134).
So, when the directory wanted to release from prison those, like Guchkov, suspected of leading the conspiracy, they were forced to concede to releasing leading Bolsheviks as well. Trotsky himself was released, officially ‘on bail’, on September 4th. On the same day, Kerensky issued an order to wind up the activities of the Military Revolutionary Committee but, under pressure from below, the Compromisers refused to go along with the instruction. Kerensky was having to recognise that the balance of forces had changed.
During the Kornilov days, Tseretelli had devised a plan for a ‘Democratic Conference’ to be convened. He hoped this could strengthen the Compromisers, giving them a new point of support against both the Bolsheviks and the next Soviet Congress (This was supposed to be held three months after the last Congress in June, but had been delayed by the Compromisers through fear they would be defeated when it met). Tseretelli hoped it could help keep Kerensky and the government in check as well. Of course, the representation was to be weighted away from the soviets and towards the co-operatives and undemocratic zemstvos so as to try and secure the ‘democracy’ a majority.
The Conference opened on September 14th. It soon became clear the Bolsheviks had still managed to gather a good level of support. Trotsky spoke to the party’s Declaration, answering the challenges being made that they were preparing to seize power. “ ‘In struggling for the power in order to realise its programme, our party … does not desire to seize the power against the organised will of the majority of the toiling masses of the country.’ That meant: We will take the power as the party of the soviet majority … ‘the organised will of the toiling masses’ referred to the coming Congress of Soviets ” (135).
The debate in support of a Coalition government clarified the three main tendencies in the Conference: “an extensive but very unstable centre which dare not seize the power, agrees to a coalition, but does not want the Kadets; a weak Right Wing which stands unconditionally for Kerensky and a coalition with the bourgeoisie; a Left Wing, twice as strong, which stands for a government of the soviets or a socialist government” (136).
A motion in favour of a coalition was narrowly passed but an amendment excluding the treacherous Kadets from the coalition was also carried. But a coalition without the main bourgeois party was pointless. So the Left and Right wings then voted together to defeat the resolution as a whole.
Despite this, Tseretelli put together a resolution calling for the Conference to appoint a smaller, permanent ‘Council of the Republic’ or ‘Pre-Parliament’, but with the inclusion of representatives of the bourgeoisie. This body was to help put together a new coalition with the Kadets and to represent ‘the nation’ until a Constituent Assembly could be elected. This was eventually agreed, with the Compromisers’ weakness and confusion displayed for all to see.
Should the Bolsheviks boycott?
“What attitude to adopt toward the Council of the Republic immediately became for the Bolsheviks an acute tactical problem. Should they enter or not? A revolutionary party can turn its back to a parliament only if it has set itself the immediate task of overthrowing the existing regime” (137).
This Pre-Parliament had been set up with a membership that bore no relation to the real balance of forces in society. Trotsky argued at the Bolshevik CC that they could not allow the revolution and the broadening power of the soviets to submit to this trickery - and so the Party should boycott the Pre-Parliament. But others like Kamenev strongly disagreed.
With the CC split down the middle, the party took the unusual step of convening a special conference made up from the Bolshevik delegates to the Democratic Conference, the Petrograd committee, and the CC members themselves. Trotsky and Rykov led for each side of the debate. By 77 to 50, the slogan of boycott was rejected.
In reality, the old divisions of April were resurfacing. Was the party going to settle for a bourgeois republic or really set itself the goal of conquering power? “Lenin was able to take part in this argument only after the event. On the 23rd of September he wrote: ‘We must boycott the Pre-Parliament. We must go out into the soviets … the trade unions, go out in general to the masses. We must summon them to struggle. To drive out the Bonapartist gang of Kerensky with its fake Pre-Parliament. Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, Comrade Trotsky!’ ” (138).
While the upper layers of the party were split, the ranks were overwhelmingly in support of Lenin and Trotsky’s slogan. For example, Efgenia Bosh found herself in a small minority on the Kiev party committee in supporting the boycott - but won an overwhelming majority at the city conference. “Thus the party promptly corrected its leaders” (139).
The new Government
Even before the Democratic Conference was over, Kerensky had already completed a deal for the Kadets to take up ministerial places in a new Coalition.
By September 25th, the final ministerial line-up was finally confirmed. Ten were ‘socialists’, six from the bourgeoisie, including the rich Moscow industrialist Konovalov who became Vice-President. He had been a member of the first coalition, resigning after the first soviet congress, joining the Kadets in time for the Kornilov insurrection. The British and French were content with the choice of reliable bourgeois representatives as ambassadors to London and Paris.
But this weak government was helpless in the face of the growing tide of protest sweeping the country. One of its first sittings was devoted to quelling the ‘anarchy’ in the villages. The agrarian revolt was reaching new heights with the peasants seizing crops and burning the landlords’ property. Protests were mounting against the sharp food crisis gripping much of the country. Prices were rising, factories closing, workers on strike. “The government, with its inattention to the masses, its light-minded indifference to their needs, its impudent phrase-mongering in answer to protests and cries of despair, was raising up everybody against it” (140).
“Nobody seriously believed in the success of the new government. Kerensky’s isolation was beyond mending. The ruling classes could not forget his betrayal of Kornilov. The growing force of the opposition paralysed his will. He evaded any decisions whatever, and avoided the Winter Palace where the situation compelled him to act. Almost immediately after the formation of the new government he slipped the presidency to Konovalov, and himself went to headquarters. He came back to Petrograd only to open the Pre-Parliament [but] returned to the front on the 14th. Kerensky was running away from a fate which followed at his heels” (141).
“The Executive Committee of the first two months could do anything – even summon the bourgeoisie to a nominal power. In the next two months the Provisional Government together with the E.C. could still do much – even start an offensive on the front. The third government, together with the enfeebled E.C., was able to begin the destruction of the Bolsheviks, but powerless to carry it through. The fourth government, arising after the longest crisis of all, was incapable of doing anything. Hardly born, it began to die and sat waiting with wide open eyes for the undertaker” (142).
“Either Kornilov or Lenin”
“ ‘Either Kornilov or Lenin’: thus Miliukov defined the alternative. Lenin on his part wrote: ‘Either a Soviet government or Kornilovism. There is no middle course.’ To this extent Miliukov and Lenin coincided in their appraisal of the situation – and not accidentally. In contrast to the heroes of the compromise phrase, these two were serious representatives of the basic classes of society” (143).
The Kadets and Bolsheviks knew that the stage was being set for civil war but both sides still held to the slogan of the Constituent Assembly for now. The bourgeoisie could not yet risk to openly reject it, the Bolsheviks still sought to defend it against the attempts of the bosses to sweep the revolution aside.
The aim of the new Coalition was clear: “to behead the revolution by shattering the Bolsheviks. But here ‘Rabochy Put’, one of the reincarnations of ‘Pravda’, impudently reminded the partners: ‘You have forgotten that the Bolsheviks are now the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.’ This reminder touched a sore point. As Miliukov recognises: ‘The fatal question presented itself: Is it not now too late to declare war on the Bolsheviks?’ ” (144).
“And indeed it actually was too late. On the day the new government was formed … the Petrograd Soviet completed the formation of a new Executive Committee, consisting of 13 Bolsheviks, 6 Social Revolutionaries and 3 Mensheviks. The Soviet greeted the governmental coalition with a resolution introduced by its new president, Trotsky. ‘The news of the formation of the government will be met by the whole revolutionary democracy with one answer: Resign! Relying upon this unanimous voice of the authentic democracy, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets will create a genuinely revolutionary government’ ” (145).
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